

**Philosophy**

**Moral Reasons and the Logical Form of Normative Arguments**

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*What does it precisely mean that we have reasons for doing what we ought to do? An answer to these questions requires an understanding of moral motivation, ethical reasoning, and the nature of the moral stance. I lay the groundwork for such a study in this paper, in which I propose an analysis of the moral stance and the logical form of normative, meta-ethical arguments.*

**Keywords:** *Moral action, moral stance, moral motivation, ethical reasoning .*

**1. Intrinsic versus Extrinsic Motivation.** Moral actions are actions in favor of other people. When we accept moral demands, we put constraints on our own egoistic desires and want to do something that benefits other people. Actions arise from motivating reasons. A motivating reason is an opinion that we take to be true and that makes us acting. What is the nature of the motivating reasons that arise from having taken the moral stance, and how do we put those reason into specifically normative, meta-ethical arguments? Let us first consider two different kinds of human motivation.

We may distinguish intrinsic from extrinsic reasons. We act with an extrinsic reason when we are motivated to perform an action or to engage in an enduring way of activity in order to get a certain reward from other people or to avoid blame and punishment. In this case, we engage in an activity not because we find it pleasant, but in order to get something in return or to avoid something unpleasant. By contrast, intrinsic motivation is engaging in an activity that it is pleasant and desirable *for its own sake*.

Let us now turn to moral reasons. There are various sources for having motivating reasons for accepting moral demands, such as, for example, the interest in successful social (and economical) cooperation, the desire for recognition, the fear for legal sanctions, altruism, religious belief, and the moral stance. The first three kinds of reasons are extrinsic ones; the acceptance of these reasons is based on certain social conditions, such as on the need for social cooperation. If there weren' t those conditions, one might not want to accept moral demands and

might just follow her/his own egoistic (or even egocentric) desires. By contrast, altruism, religious belief, and the moral stance provide intrinsic moral reasons. A person who acts on these reasons doesn't need any other extrinsic reason; she will accept moral demands even if she would not have to expect social disadvantages or punishment for the immoral actions she could do. Intrinsic moral motivation is part of a person's character and her *self-understanding* as a moral person. Moral agents with intrinsic moral reasons accept moral demands for their own sake, regardless of the social situation they live in. The most powerful, stable and reliable source of morality is, as I take it, the moral stance.

**2. The Moral Stance.** The moral stance is a person's capacity and enduring motivation to recognize common goods, to accept moral demands and to respect other person's happiness-conducive interests. Having taken the moral stance, we might also feel committed to altruism and /or to a religious belief. The moral stance is, however, different from altruism and religious belief insofar it entails what we may call the awareness of humanity. This kind of moral motivation can be conjoined with altruism and religious belief, but it doesn't depend on these two other sources of morality.

Having taken the moral stance we put constraints on our self-interests. Hence moral agents are capable of having second order volitions. The moral stance includes the particular capacity of practical reasoning. Through practical reasoning we form intentions, which consist of a belief and a desire. Practical reasoning therefore is both a cognitive, and volitional capacity—for an intention without a belief would lack propositional content, and an intention without a desire would lack motivating force.<sup>1</sup> As moral agents we recognize *common goods*, which moral actions aim to protect. (iii) Moral experiences create a specifically moral familiarity between persons, which is an intermediate inter-personal, emotional stance between contractual obligations and private familiarity (friendship, love). Moral agents consider each other not merely as contracting parties who agree upon certain terms of contract, but they rather also have certain attitudes towards each other, such as resentment, gratitude, respect or moral indignation.<sup>2</sup> Morality is a *mode* of people's *encountering* with each other. As moral agents we share the desire for the common experiences of respect, solidarity, sincerity, and trust.

Human beings pursue happiness, and all our happiness-conducive deliberate activity is pleasant and therefore intrinsically desirable. This assumption about the *conditio humana*, which I take to be uncontroversial, has an important implication for the understanding of morality. Given our pursuit of happiness, we

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1 Cf. I explain this thesis about practical reasoning in Hardy 2011, pp. 344-352.

2 Cf. Peter Strawson's explanation of what he calls „reactive attitudes“ (Strawson 1962).

can maintain the moral stance only if moral agency is pleasant and intrinsically desirable, for otherwise we could not maintain the moral stance for a lifetime. There are various kinds of pleasure. Morality's pleasure is what we may call *modal pleasure*. Modal pleasure is a *mode of activity*—as opposed to mere sensations of pleasure. A person enjoys modal pleasure when she successfully exercises her capacities (or skills).<sup>1</sup> I assume that the moral stance is a necessary condition for the successful exercise of our happiness-conducive human capacities—above all for our personal autonomy— and is therefore in every individual person's interest. If this is true, then moral agency is pleasant and intrinsically desirable. It is true, many moral actions are arduous, even painful and therefore unpleasant in terms of *sensate* pleasure, but those actions can nevertheless be desirable and pleasant in terms of *modal* pleasure.

Having taken the moral stance we accept moral demands, which have four crucial features:

- (i) Moral demands aim to *protect common goods*, such as bodily integrity and autonomy. For this reason, arguments for ethical claims have to rely on general evaluative assumptions, which ideally every person can agree upon. Since the acceptance of a moral demand expresses the will of a person, the general evaluative assumptions of ethical arguments—that we might also call ethical principles—are common agreements.
- (ii) Moral demands are *evident*: What we owe to each other, is obvious because we all know the common goods, which moral demands aim to protect. Morality is, as Kant says, a matter of fact of reason („ein Faktum der Vernunft“, cf. Kant: *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, 5:31). So we do not need complex and fallible reasonings in order to understand the content of moral demands. However, we need complex reasonings in order to find solutions to particular ethical problems.
- (iii) Moral demands are *universal*; they hold for any person and any action in any situation—regardless of any particular property of an individual person.
- (iv) Moral demands are *categorical* (or unconditional, respectively); moral actions do not depend on any particular condition and they are not primarily a mean for achieving a certain end, but they are rather

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<sup>1</sup> I adopt the term „modal pleasure“ from George Rudebusch who introduces this term in his interpretation of Socrates' conceptions of virtue and pleasure: Rudebusch 2002, pp. 5-7; 92-96. We can in fact trace back the idea of modal pleasures to the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, cf. the references in Rudebusch 2002 and Hardy 2011.

an end in itself. It is true; we very often do moral actions for their own sake as well as for the sake of social advantages, because we seek social recognition and want to avoid blame and punishment. Having taken the moral stance, we, however, do moral actions for their own sake because they contribute to our pursuit of happiness.

If we accept moral demands for their own sake, we then follow moral laws, which aim to protect common goods. All human beings are equal in seeking happiness; we all have the desire for conducting a good life. And we all *share* the same *vulnerability*. We know that we all share the same vulnerable properties, and once we are aware of the fact that moral laws are made to protect the vulnerable properties of human beings, we know that moral laws must be *universal*. Everyone can suffer from pain and noone wants to suffer from pain. This is what we all know. So if we accept an *individual person's* demand not to be hurt because we consider it a *moral* demand, then we accept *everyone's* demand not to be hurt. If I am sure that not inflicting pain to a human being is morally right, I expect everyone else to think the same way. The very idea that there is an obligation *only for me*—or a particular group of people, respectively—to perform moral actions does not make sense. Once we are aware of the fact that moral laws are made for protecting *common* goods, we know that moral laws must be unconditional. If we seriously respect the happiness-conducive interests of other persons, we want to do this under *any* possible conditions—even though we might sometimes fail to perform morally right actions due to negligence. It would not make sense to accept moral demands and to do moral actions merely as a means for achieving a certain particular end that we would *not* want to achieve under some other conditions. Protecting a common good is—to put it in Kantian terms—an end in itself. When we want to protect *common* goods, we consider moral demands universal and unconditional.

There is a possible objection against the idea of categorical moral demands: Imagine a situation in which someone hurts an assassin in order to prevent him from attacking defenseless people. Actions of that kind are undoubtedly morally right. In some cases, in which a person is faced with a conflict of moral norms, she has to break a certain moral law and to impair a certain good in order to protect a higher good. The fact of moral conflicts shows that we need to agree upon a hierarchy of goods in order to solve those conflicts, but it does not conflict the assumption that moral demands are categorical (or unconditional, respectively).

There are two paradoxes of moral motivation. The first one is the paradox of an universal will. It is true; *individual* persons make decisions for actions. Yet we consider moral actions as if the source of those actions is a will, which

is the same in every human being. This is the idea of the Kantian *categorical imperative*: We consider our own individual moral wanting as if it were not merely our individual, but rather an *universal* will—in Kant’s words: „Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law“ (Kant, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, p. 421). The second paradox concerns volitional necessity (Generally on volitional necessity cf. Frankfurt 1999). There is no necessity in human decision making and acting. When we make a decision, we can always choose between (at least two) alternative possibilities. And yet we consider decisions for moral actions as *if* we had no choice to do otherwise. This is the idea of a *duty* (Pflicht). Duties are what we have in mind when speaking of actions that we *ought to do*. A duty is self-binding and it creates a quasi-necessity.

**3. The Awareness for Humanity.** Particular instances of common goods have *vulnerable* properties that moral demands aim to protect. A certain property is vulnerable because it can be impaired or even destroyed, and we consider such a property valuable because we want to protect it. Human beings share various common goods, to which general evaluative premisses of ethical arguments refer to, such as human dignity, social justice, the common benefit. I endorse value-pluralism, but I assume that there is one supreme common good for every human being: human dignity, which includes—above all—bodily integrity and personal autonomy. If this is true, we all can agree upon the assumption that we always have and want to protect these elements of dignity—regardless of national or ethnical origin, social status, language, gender, religion or political opinion. The insight into the supreme value of human dignity is the motivating reason for moral obligation: We know that everyone can suffer from bodily pain and from losing the authority over her/his own life, and we do not *want* anyone to suffer or to lose authority over her/his life. Let us call this insight the *awareness for humanity*. The awareness for humanity is both a certain kind of knowledge (or understanding, respectively), and empathy. We all know what it means to be hurt or to lose authority over one’s own life. These experiences are common ones—we just did not have them without sharing them with other persons. We share these experiences because we are human beings. Empathy provides the awareness for humanity with its volitional and motivating force. But there is no universal empathy, for only propositional attitudes can be generalized. The awareness for humanity therefore requires empathy and understanding—the understanding of the *human condition*. Once we have become aware of the supreme value of physical integrity and autonomy, we know for certain that we do not want to harm anyone. Since the moral stance entails both understanding,

and empathy, the kind of moral insight that has a sufficiently strong motivating force, is the recognition and *acceptance* of a (common) good. The *acceptance* of a *good* conjoins the insight that a certain vulnerable and valuable thing is in fact a good with the intention to protect such a good for its own sake—regardless of any other particular interest that one might also have for protecting a certain good. We would not have the *belief* that something is a *good* without having the desire to *protect* it. In other words: The acceptance of a good is a motivational belief.

**4. Varieties of Dignity.** The awareness for humanity entails the recognition and acceptance of human dignity as the supreme common good. Let us distinguish three kinds of dignity. Human dignity is (1) a legal status; the protection of dignity guarantees the protection of human rights, as stated in Article 1 of the universal declaration of human rights as well as in Article 1 of the German constitution, (2) a moral status, which moral agents ascribe to each other when accepting moral demands, (3) an individual person's self-relation.

The universal declaration of human rights by the United Nations, i.e., the United Nations general assembly resolution 217 A states:

Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. (...)

Article 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

The first article of the German constitution (Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG) states:

Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schützen ist Verpflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt.

Das Deutsche Volk bekennt sich darum zu unverletzlichen und unveräußerlichen Menschenrechten als Grundlage jeder menschlichen Gemeinschaft, des Friedens und der Gerechtigkeit in der Welt.

Die nachfolgenden Grundrechte binden Gesetzgebung, vollziehende Gewalt und Rechtsprechung als unmittelbar geltendes Recht.

Article 1 of the German constitution conjoins human dignity and the protection of human rights. The legal status of human dignity and the set of human rights are coextensive; the protection of dignity comprises the protection of the various particular human rights. It makes, however, good sense to explicitly state dignity as the *one* supreme good because this legal statement ensures the inclusion of *all* human rights into dignity, and it also allows for the inclusion of further goods

and corresponding rights into the realm of dignity. Thomas Gutmann 2014 explains the legal meaning of human dignity as an „absolute constraint“: „Der Würdegrundsatz (i. e. Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG) umschreibt das Fundament reziproker Anerkennung von Menschen als Rechtspersonen. Seine primäre (...) Funktion ist die eines *constraints*, einer deontologisch verstandenen *Grenze* dessen, was Rechtspersonen angetan werden darf. (...) Der Würdegrundsatz ist weder Gegenstand noch Resultat von Prozessen der Güterabwägung“ (ebd., p. 62).<sup>□</sup>

**5. Kant on the Categorical Imperative.** The German philosopher Immanuel Kant brilliantly voices the idea of dignity as the supreme moral value in his formulation of the categorical imperative. The first formulation of the categorical imperative says: „Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law“ (Kant, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, p. 421). Kant then proceeds to explain the categorical imperative as the respect for mankind and dignity:

Der praktische (kategorische, JH) Imperativ wird (...) folgender sein: Handle so, dass du die Menschheit, sowohl in deiner Person, als in der Person eines jeden andern, jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß als Mittel brauchtest. (...) Die praktische Notwendigkeit, nach diesem Prinzip zu handeln, d.i. die Pflicht, beruht gar nicht auf Gefühlen, Antrieben und Neigungen, sondern bloß auf dem Verhältnis vernünftiger Wesen zu einander, in welchem der Wille eines vernünftigen Wesens jederzeit zugleich als gesetzgebend betrachtet werden muß (...) Die Vernunft bezieht also die Maxime des Willens als allgemein gesetzgebend auf jeden anderen Willen, und auch auf jede Handlung gegen sich selbst, und dies zwar nicht um irgend eines andern praktischen Bewegungsgrundes (...) willen, sondern aus der Idee der Würde eines vernünftigen Wesens, das keinem Gesetze gehorcht, als dem, das es zugleich selbst gibt. Im Reich der Zwecke hat alles entweder einen Preis, oder eine Würde. Was einen Preis hat, an dessen Stelle kann auch etwas anderes als Äquivalent gesetzt werden; was dagegen über allen Preis erhaben ist (...), das hat eine Würde. (...) Nun ist Moralität die Bedingung, unter der allein ein vernünftiges Wesen Zweck an sich selbst sein kann, weil nur durch sie es möglich ist, ein gesetzgebend Glied im Reiche der Zwecke zu sein. Also ist Sittlichkeit und die Menschheit, so fern sie derselben fähig ist, dasjenige, was allein Würde hat. (*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, pp. 429-435).<sup>□</sup>

The (one and only) Kantian categorical imperative says that every person has to treat any other person always not merely as a means, but as an end in itself.

The respect for dignity is an insight of reason and a social practice. The kingdom of ends („Reich der Zwecke“) can only be built on the ground of morality. Dignity has no price, no equivalent. When we offer a product at the market, we want to get a good price for our product. We make a business about a product with someone, if—and only if—we get an equivalent for what we give. By contrast, the respect for dignity does not depend on getting an equivalent and does therefore—in Kant’s view—not depend on any particular interest of a person. If we follow a maxim that should become a universal law and so treat every person as an end in itself, we then accept universal, unconditional moral demands. If the self-governing will (der gesetzgebende Wille) is independent of a person’s particular interest, it is then a volitional second order capability.<sup>1</sup>

**6. Dignity and Autonomy.** Dignity as a self-relation is the capacity of personal *autonomy*; an autonomous person is capable of protecting and defending her own dignity. Personal autonomy includes both social autonomy, and mental autonomy. Social autonomy is a person’s capability to exercise authority over her own life and to claim legal and moral rights, whereas mental autonomy is—above all—self-determination and self-governance. Social autonomy requires protection by laws (by a legal system), access to elementary goods such as water, food, health-care, and education, a minimum income, the absence of coercion and manipulation, and—last but not least—privacy.

Mental autonomy (gedankliche Selbstbestimmung) is a person’s ability of clearly understanding and *guiding* her mental states. An autonomous person is able to guide her beliefs, desires, and intentions in such a way that she can pursue *general, supreme goals*, such as doing research, building a house, taking care for her family etc. With all our particular deliberate actions we pursue general, supreme goals. We need to have such goals in order to choose between alternative actions and to make rational decisions. A general goal is a goal that we pursue with several actions of the same kind. If I go for a 5 kilometre run every morning, I pursue the general, supreme goal of staying healthy. Someone else may do the same every morning because he trains to run a marathon, which finally serves his general goal of testing the limits of his physical capabilities. A supreme goal is a goal that has priority over others. If I decide to give money to charity that I could also spend for travelling around the world, then I give helping other people priority over experiencing new countries and their cultures. If I want to write a philosophical book, I give thinking about philosophical arguments priority over other cognitive activities—such as, for example, writing a novel or studying the composition of *Verdi’s* operas—that I could do during that long period. If we have to choose between two or more alternative actions, we then choose the one that serves a general, supreme goal. We pursue such goals, once we know what

we want to do and have the will we want to have. In other words: We pursue general, supreme goals through self-determination.

Self-determination is itself a general goal. Let us distinguish *material* from *modal* goals. If we pursue a material goal, we want to create a certain state in the world, such as writing a letter, building a house or setting a sail. If we pursue a modal goal, we want to *do* something in a certain way. Pursuing a modal goal, we seek to successfully exercise a capacity (or skill), and successful actions give modal pleasure. Though it seems that we always pursue both material and modal goals with one and the same action, it makes good sense to distinguish these two kinds of goals. It is true that human beings pursue many different material goals. The successful exercise of self-determination is, however, a *modal* goal that everyone pursues because we can only achieve our material goals, if we really *know* what we want to do and have the will we want to have.

Self-determination includes self-evaluation, which allows us for confirming or denying our spontaneous mental states. There are three basic kinds of self-relations: We can confirm or deny a spontaneous belief, desire or intention, and we can also feel ambivalent towards a spontaneous belief or desire. I might, for example, think about sailing with my sailing boat *Westwind* from Hamburg to New York in the summer of 2022. Such a plan needs careful consideration. So I examine the advantages and disadvantages of such a journey and evaluate my intention through forming second order volitions. If I come to the conclusion that I really want to make the journey, I then have confirmed my previous, spontaneous intention to do so. And if I come to the conclusion that I do not want to make the journey, I then have denied and given up my previous intention to do so. In both cases, in which I say either „Yes“ or „No“ to my previous, spontaneous intention, I finally have a clear, explicit intention that can serve as a basis for a rational decision. I make a rational decision if I have carefully considered all the relevant and available reasons that speak for or against a certain action. We comment on those mental states by saying that we are *sure* and know *for certain* that we want to this and that. As long as we are indecisive—torn between two (or more) options—we are ambivalent towards a certain spontaneous belief or desire, and ambivalence endangers our autonomy. As autonomous agents we are able to evaluate our spontaneous mental states and to make rational decisions. We need social and mental autonomy in order to protect our own dignity. It is quite obvious that we need social autonomy, but mental autonomy is no less important, because our mental autonomy can save us from manipulation and the negative aspects of epistemic dependence.

The acceptance of moral demands is a necessary condition for our striving for autonomy and so is the moral stance built into our *reflective* pursuit of happiness.

Here is an argument for this claim (let me call it the argument from autonomy): In our *reflective* pursuit of happiness we (always) aim to create best conditions for our own (social and mental) autonomy. If we aim to create best conditions for our *own* autonomy, we then interact with other people in such a way that we also promote *their* autonomy. And if we interact with other people in such a way that we promote their autonomy, we have taken the moral stance. For only if we protect each other's vulnerability and respect each other's happiness-conducive interests, we are able to promote each other's autonomy. In our reflective pursuit of happiness we therefore have taken the moral stance.<sup>1</sup>

**7. The Logical Form of Normative Arguments.** Reasons are premises of arguments. A valid argument has true premises and a true conclusion, which follows from the premises just because of the *logical form* of the argument. Meta-ethical arguments have a normative conclusion, that is, a conclusion that says that we ought to do something. Arguments with a normative conclusion have both *evaluative*, and *descriptive* premises that refer to common goods and to moral actions. When we argue for ethical claims, we agree on *general evaluative* premises, which express assumptions about common goods whose particular instances have certain *vulnerable* properties  $\{V_1, \dots, V_n\}$ . For example, the human body's vulnerable property is the fact that it can suffer from pain. A person's mind can be manipulated. A person's dignity can be humiliated. Those are the vulnerable properties ethical arguments typically refer to. More precisely: When we argue for ethical claims, we have to make (i) general evaluative assumptions about common goods that we want to protect, which ideally all moral agents can agree upon, (ii) general and particular descriptive assumptions about the vulnerable properties of a given *particular instance* of a common good, and finally (iii) general and particular descriptive assumptions, which state that a certain action A (or actions of the kind A, respectively) is (are) necessary and adequate for protecting the vulnerable properties of a particular instance of a common good. A moral action A is adequate if and only if an agent is in the position to do A and doing A does not impair her/his own well being. Arguments for ethical claims take this form:

(1) ( $\forall$ common good CG,  $\forall$ person,  $\forall$ vulnerable property V): If an abstract entity CG is a common good and if (logically speaking) a particular instance of the common good CG, that is, every individual person, has the vulnerable property V, then every person wants to protect the vulnerable property V of any other person. (The antecedens of this premise contains an evaluative as well as a descriptive statement.)

(2) ( $\forall$ common good CG,  $\forall$ person,  $\forall$ vulnerable property V): The entity CG is a common good and every individual person has the vulnerable property V.

(3) ( $\forall$ person,  $\forall$  vulnerable property V): Therefore every person wants to protect everyone's vulnerable property V.

(4) ( $\forall$ person P,  $\forall$ action A,  $\forall$ vulnerable property V): If every person wants to protect everyone's vulnerable property V and if performing actions of the kind A is necessary and adequate for the protection of the vulnerable property V of person A, then person B (and any other person) ought to perform actions of the kind A and must not do opposing actions of the kind non-A.

(5) ( $\forall$ person,  $\forall$ action A): Performing actions of the kind A is necessary and adequate for the protection of person A's vulnerable property V.

Conclusion: Therefore person B (and any other person) ought to do actions of the kind A.

Here is an example:

(1) If human dignity is a common good and if every individual person—as being a particular instance of the common good human dignity—has the vulnerable property that she can suffer from poverty, then every person wants to protect everyone who now lives in poverty from future poverty.

(2) Human dignity is a common good and every individual person can suffer from poverty.

(3) Therefore every person wants to protect everyone who now lives in poverty from future poverty.

(4) If we want to protect everyone who now lives in poverty from future poverty and if donating five percent of our gross income to global organisations, which reliably and efficiently help people who now live in poverty, is necessary and adequate for protecting these people from future poverty, we ought to donate five percent of our gross income to global organizations, which reliably and efficiently help people who now live in poverty.

(5) Donating five percent of our gross income to global organisations, which reliably and efficiently help people who now live in poverty, is necessary and adequate (and even sufficient) for protecting these people from future poverty.

Conclusion: Therefore we ought to donate five percent of our gross income to global organisations, which reliably and efficiently help people who now live in poverty.

Arguments of this kind are not vulnerable to the objection of the so called naturalistic fallacy since the premisses entail the entire evaluative information of the conclusion.

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ფილოსოფია

## მორალური მიზეზები და ნორმატიული არგუმენტების ლოგიკური ფორმა

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აკაკი წერეთლის სახელმწიფო უნივერსიტეტი  
ქუთაისი, საქართველო

როგორია მორალური პოზიციის ბუნება? ზუსტად რას ნიშნავს ის, რომ ჩვენ გვაქვს მიზეზები იმისა, რაც უნდა გავაკეთოთ? პასუხი ამ კითხვებზე მოითხოვს მორალური მოტივაციის, გადაწყვეტილების მიღებისა და ეთიკური მსჯელობის გაგებას. ნაშრომში შემოგთავაზებთ მორალური პოზიციისა და ეთიკური არგუმენტების სტრუქტურის ანალიზს.

**საკვანძო სიტყვები:** მორალური ქმედება, მორალური პოზიცია, მორალური მოტივაცია, ეთიკური მსჯელობა.

მორალურია ქმედებები, რომლებიც მიმართულია სხვათა სასარგებლოდ. როდესაც ვიღებთ მორალურ მოთხოვნებს, ჩვენ ვზღლუდავთ საკუთარ ეგოისტურ სურვილებს და გვსურს გავაკეთოთ ისეთი რამ, რაც სარგებელს მოუტანს სხვა ადამიანებს. ქმედებები მამოტივირებელი მიზეზებიდან მომდინარეობს. მამოტივირებელი მიზეზი აზრია, რომელსაც ჭეშმარიტებად ვიღებთ და ის გვიბიძგებს მოქმედებისკენ.

რატომ ვახორციელებთ იმ ქმედებებს, რასაც ვახორციელებთ? რა ასტიმულირებს ჩვენს ქმედებებს? ფილოსოფოსებმა და ფსიქოლოგებმა შემოგთავაზეს ადამიანური მოტივაციის ახსნა, მათ შორის განსხვავება იმის მიხედვით, მოტივაცია გარედან ჩნდება (გარეგანი) თუ შიგნიდან (შინაგანი). ჩვენ შეგვიძლია მოტივაციის ამ ორი სახის ახსნა შემდეგნაირად: გარეგანი მოტივაცია ჩნდება მაშინ, როდესაც ჩვენ ვართ მოტივირებულნი განვახორციელოთ რაიმე ქმედება ან კონკრეტულ აქტივობაში ჩავერთოთ რამე ჯილდოს მოპოვების ან სირცხვილისა და სასჯელის თავიდან აცილების მიზნით. ამ შემთხვევაში, ჩვენ ვმოქმედებთ არა იმ მიზეზით, რომ გვსიამოვნებს ამის კეთება, არამედ სანაცვლოდ რაღაცის მიღება ან არასასურველის თავიდან აცილება გვსურს. სხვა სიტყვებით: თუ ვმოქმედებთ გარეგანი მოტივაციით, ესე იგი ჩვენ ვაკეთებთ რამეს, იმიტომ, რომ ეს უნდა გავაკეთოთ. ამის საწინააღმდეგოდ, შინაგანი მოტივაცია გულისხმობს, ისეთ აქტივობაში ჩართვას, რომელიც

## იორგ ჰარდი

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ჩვენთვის სასიამოვნო და სასურველია. თავად საქმიანობაა ჯილდო, სხვა სიტყვებით: მე ვაკეთებ რაღაცას იმიტომ, რომ ნამდვილად მინდა მისი გაკეთება. მთავარი განსხვავება მოტივაციის ამ ორ სახეს შორის არის ის, რომ გარეგანი მოტივაცია მოდის ინდივიდისგან დამოუკიდებლად, მაშინ როდესაც შინაგანი ჩნდება შიგნიდან. მორალური მოთხოვნების მისაღებად არსებობს მორალური მოტივების სხვადასხვა წყარო, როგორებიცაა, მაგ: წარმატებული სოციალური (და ეკონომიკური) გაერთიანებით დაინტერესება, აღიარების სურვილი, სამართლებრივი სანქციების შიში, ალტრუიზმი, რელიგიური რწმენა და მორალური პოზიცია. ეს პირველი სამი სახის მოტივი გარეგანია. ამ მოტივთა მიღება ეფუძნება განსაზღვრულ სოციალურ მდგომარეობას, როგორცაა სოციალური გაერთიანების საჭიროება. რომ არ ყოფილიყო ეს მდგომარეობა, ვიღაცას შესაძლოა არ მოესურვა მორალური მოთხოვნების მიღება და უბრალოდ გაყოლოდა საკუთარ ეგოისტურ (ან თუნდაც ეგოცენტრულ) სურვილებს. ამის საწინააღმდეგოდ, ალტრუიზმი, რელიგიური რწმენა და მორალური პოზიცია შინაგან მორალურ მოტივებს წარმოადგენს. ადამიანს, რომელიც ამ მოტივებით მოქმედებს, სხვა გარეგანი მოტივი არ სჭირდება.

მორალური პოზიცია ადამიანის უნარი და მტკიცე მოტივაციაა, აღიაროს საერთო სიკეთე, მიიღოს მორალური მოთხოვნები და პატივი სცეს სხვათა ბედნიერების მამოტივირებელ ინტერესებს. მორალური პოზიციის მიღებით, შესაძლოა, თავი ვალდებულადაც ვიგრძნოთ ალტრუიზმისა და რელიგიური რწმენის მიმართ. თუმცა, მორალური პოზიცია, ალტრუიზმისა და რელიგიური რწმენისგან განსხვავდება იმდენად, რამდენადაც ის გულისხმობს იმას, რასაც შეიძლება ადამიანის ცნობიერება ვუწოდოთ. ამ ტიპის მორალური მოტივაცია შეიძლება იყოს დაკავშირებული ალტრუიზმსა და რელიგიურ რწმენასთან, მაგრამ ის არ არის დამოკიდებული მორალურობის ამ ორ სხვა წყაროზე.

მორალურ პოზიციას გააჩნია სამი ასპექტი:

1. მორალური პოზიციის დაკავებით ჩვენ საკუთარ ინტერესებს ვზღუდავთ. ამგვარად, მორალურ აგენტებს შეუძლიათ იქონიონ მეორე რიგის ნებელობა. მორალური პოზიცია მოიცავს პრაქტიკული მსჯელობის კონკრეტულ უნარს. პრაქტიკული მსჯელობის გზით ჩვენ ვაყალიბებთ განზრახვებს, რომლებიც რწმენისა და მისწრაფებებისგან შედგება. მაშასადამე, პრაქტიკული მსჯელობა წარმოადგენს როგორც კოგნიტურ, ისე ნებელობით უნარს, რამეთუ განზრახვას რწმენის გარეშე არ ექნებოდა ჭეშმარიტად მიჩნეული შინაარსი, ხოლო განზრახვას სურვილის გარეშე დააკლდებოდა მამოტივირებელი ძალა.

2. ჩვენ, როგორც მორალურად მოქმედი პირები, ვაღიარებთ საზოგადო

სიკეთებს, რომელთა დაცვაც, სწორედ მორალური ქმედებების მიზანს წარმოადგენს.

3. მორალური გამოცდილებები პიროვნებებს შორის სპეციფიკურ მორალურ სიახლოვეს ქმნის, რაც კონტრაქტულ ვალდებულებებსა და კერძო სიახლოვეს (მეგობრობა, სიყვარული) შორის უშუალო ინტერ-პერსონალური ემოციური პოზიციაა.

რაც შეეხება თვითგამორკვევას, იგი მოიცავს თვითშეფასებას, რაც გვამდევს საშალებას ჩვენი სპონტანური რწმენებისა და მისწრაფებების დადასტურების ან უარყოფის საშალებას. არსებობს თვითშეფასების სამი ძირითადი სახე: ჩვენ შეგვიძლია დავადასტუროთ ან უარვყოთ სპონტანური რწმენა, სურვილი ან მისწრაფება, და ჩვენ, ასევე, შეგვიძლია გვქონდეს ამბივალენტური დამოკიდებულება სპონტანური რწმენის მისწრაფებების მიმართ. მაგალითად, მე შეიძლება ვიფიქრო ჩემი ნავით ჰამბურგიდან დასავლეთით, ნიუ-იორკისკენ ნაოსნობაზე 2022 წლის ზაფხულში. ასეთი გეგმა ფრთხილ გააზრებას მოითხოვს. ასე რომ, მე ვაანალიზებ ასეთი მოგზაურობის უპირატესობებსა და უარყოფით მხარეებს და ვაფასებ ჩემს განზრახვას მეორე რიგის ნებელობის ფორმირების გზით. თუ მივალ დასკვნამდე, რომ ნამდვილად მინდა ამ მოგზაურობის მოწყობა, მაშინ მე ვადასტურებ მანამდე სპონტანურ განზრახვას და თუ მივალ იმ დასკვნამდე, რომ არ მსურს ამ მოგზაურობის მოწყობა, მაშინ მე უარვყოფ ჩემს მანამდე განზრახვას და ხელს ვიღებ მასზე. ორივე შემთხვევაში, როცა ვეუბნები „კი-ს“ ან „არა-ს“ ჩემს ადრინდელ, სპონტანურ განზრახვას, საბოლოოდ, ვიღებ ნათელ, ექსპლიციტურ განზრახვას, რომელიც შეიძლება იყოს რაციონალური გადაწყვეტილებების მიღების სურვილი. მე ვიღებ რაციონალურ გადაწყვეტილებას, თუ ყურადღებით ვითვალისწინებ ყველა იმ შესაძლო და რელევანტურ მიზეზს, რომელიც წარმოადგენს ამ მოქმედების საწინააღმდეგო არგუმენტს. ჩვენ ამ მენტალურ მდგომარეობებს ვეხმარებით და ვეუბნებით, რომ ვართ დარწმუნებულნი და დანამდვილებით ვიცით, რომ გვსურს ამის და ამის გაკეთება. მანამ, სანამ ჩვენ გადაუწყვეტელნი ვართ - ვყოყმანობთ ორ (ან მეტ) ვარიანტს შორის - ჩვენ ვართ ამბივალენტური გარკვეულ, სპონტანურ რწმენასა და მისწრაფებასთან მიმართებით და ეს ამბივალენტურობა საფრთხეს უქმნის ჩვენს ავტონომიას. როგორც ავტონომიურ პირებს, ჩვენ შეგვიძლია შევაფასოთ ჩვენი სპონტანური აზრობრივი მდგომარეობები, რათა მივიღოთ გონივრული გადაწყვეტილებები. ჩვენ გვჭირდება სოციალური და მენტალური ავტონომია საკუთარი ღირსების დასაცავად. ძალიან ჩვეულებრივი ამბავია, რომ გვჭირდება სოციალური ავტონომია, მაგრამ მენტალური ავტონომიაც არანაკლებ მნიშვნელოვანია. მენტალურ

## იორგ ჰარდი

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ავტონომიას შეუძლია დაგვიცვას მანიპულაციისა და ეპისტემიური დამოკიდებულების ნეგატიური ასპექტებისგან.

### *მადლიერება*

*სასარგებლო კომენტარებისთვის მადლობას ვუხდით რობერტ აუდის, ლუდვიგ სიეჰსა და მათ სირაბიმეს.*